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Panel surveys generally suffer from “seam bias”--too few transitions observed within reference periods
and too many reported between interviews. Seam bias is likely to affect duration models severely since
both the start date and the end date of a spell may be misreported.  In this paper we examine the employment
dynamics of disadvantaged single mothers in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
while correcting for seam bias in reported employment status.  We develop parametric misreporting
models for use in multi-state, multi-spell duration analysis; the models are identified if misreporting
parameters are the same for fresh and left-censored spells of the same type. We extend these models
to allow misreporting to depend on individual characteristics and for a certain fraction of the sample
never to misreport. These extensions are informative about misreporting, but do not affect estimates
of the hazard functions. We compare our results to two approaches used previously: i) using only data
on the last month of reference periods and ii) adding a dummy variable for the last month of the reference
periods. We find that there are important differences between our estimates and those obtained from
ii), and very important differences between our estimates and those obtained from i).  Finally, we also
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Panel surveys generally suffer from “seam bias.” This refers to the fact that transitions or 
changes in status within reference periods are underreported while too many transitions or changes 
are reported as occurring between interviews.  To the best of our knowledge, this effect was noted 
first by Czajka (1983) for benefit receipt in the U.S. Income Survey Development Program.  Since 
then seam effects have been documented for various longitudinal surveys, e.g. the Current 
Population Survey, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the Canadian Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics, the European Community Household Panel Survey, the British Household Panel 
Survey, the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and banking data.1  Lemaitre (1992) 
concludes that all current longitudinal surveys appear to be affected by seam problems, regardless of 
differences in the length of recall periods or other design features. Seam bias poses an important 
problem for the SIPP, which was intended to provide accurate reporting of labor force and program 
participation dynamics at the monthly level.  The existence of seam bias plausibly would be most 
serious for estimating duration models, since it affects the timing of transitions.  The Census Bureau, 
which collects the SIPP, has long recognized this problem and has attempted to reduce it in the SIPP, 
most recently by incorporating “dependent interviewing” procedures in the 2004 panel of the survey.  
Notwithstanding the adoption of such procedures, which explicitly link the wording of current 
interview questions to information provided in the preceding interview, seam bias continues to be a 
substantial problem in the SIPP (Moore 2008).   
Pischke (1995) proposes a method for dealing with seam bias in the SIPP when using data 
on continuous variables such as income. Here we address the issues that occur with duration models 
when seam bias is present; the extension to other limited dependent variable models is 
straightforward. Specifically, we allow for seam bias when estimating monthly discrete time duration 
models to analyze the employment dynamics of single mothers with a high school education or less, a 
group that has been the focus of much recent policy.  We estimate monthly transition rates into and 
out of employment for the period 1986-1995, prior to the replacement of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  Transitions 
into and out of employment are of crucial importance to policymakers, as they determine 
unemployment rates, poverty rates and the overall well-being of low-income individuals.  The SIPP is 
particularly well-suited to estimate such models because of its detailed monthly information on 
employment and program participation.  
                                                 
1 See Moore (2008) for a summary of seam bias research.  See Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999) for information 
about seam bias in banking data.   3
With the exception of studies focusing on job training outcomes (see, for example, Ham and 
LaLonde (1996) and Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde (1997) who analyze employment dynamics using 
data from the National Supported Work and Job Training Partnership Act experiments, respectively) 
there have been relatively few studies of employment dynamics for less-educated women. (An 
exception is Aaronson and Pingle 2006, who study employment dynamics among single mothers in 
the 1990-2001 SIPP panels.)  On the other hand, welfare dynamics for less-educated women have 
been examined in numerous studies, e.g. Blank and Ruggles (1996), Acs, Philips, and Nelson (2003) 
and Ribar (2005).  Note that employment dynamics and welfare dynamics will differ, as single 
mothers can work and collect welfare simultaneously, and can certainly be out of employment and 
off welfare simultaneously. A clear understanding of employment dynamics is essential for policy; for 
example policy makers are likely to be very interested in the determinants of employment duration, 
since short employment spells prevent individuals from acquiring on-the-job human capital.  Further, 
as we show below, our results have important implications for the debate over whether transitions 
into non-employment are pro-cyclical (Elsby, Michaels, and Solon 2009 and Shimer 2005a, 2005b). 
   Most of the welfare duration studies have estimated some form of discrete time hazard 
models using the SIPP or other panel surveys.2  Consequently, these studies have been forced to 
confront the seam bias problem.  The approaches used in the literature to address this problem can 
be grouped into three types.  One approach is to use the monthly data and to include a dummy 
variable for the last month of the reference period in addition to an indicator variable for each 
reference period (known as a “wave” in the SIPP).  Blank and Ruggles (1996) use this approach in 
their study of entry into and exit from welfare and Food Stamps using the 1986 and 1987 SIPP 
panels.  Fitzgerald (2004) uses a similar approach in his study of welfare exits using the 1986, 1988, 
1990, and 1992 SIPP panels.  A second approach involves collapsing the monthly data into data by 
wave and setting participation and employment indicator variables to be 1 if respondents were 
employed or on welfare in a sub-period of a wave.  Acs, Philips, and Nelson (2003) use the 1990 and 
1996 SIPP panels to focus on welfare entry, setting welfare participation to be 1 for a wave if 
participation was reported in at least two of the four months in a wave, and zero otherwise. Ribar 
(2005) uses the 1992 and 1993 panels of the SIPP to examine welfare entry and exit, setting 
participation equal to one for a wave if participation was reported for at least one month in the wave, 
and zero otherwise. This redefines the concept of participation and will result in the loss of short 
spells. To see this, note that an individual could have a two-month spell of nonparticipation in a 
reference period but this spell would not be counted in the analysis. This approach will be especially 
                                                 
2 For example Gittleman (2001) and Hofferth, Stanhope, and Harris (2002) use data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate dynamic models of welfare exit or entry.   4
problematic if used in modeling employment dynamics, since employment spells are often quite short 
for the disadvantaged population. 
Another very common solution to the seam bias problem in the SIPP data is to use only the 
last month observation from each wave, dropping the three other months. (For example, Grogger 
2004, Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005b, and Aaronson and Pingle 2006 use this approach.) Two 
reasons are given for using the last month data. First, most transitions take place between waves, i.e. 
in the last month. However, as we show in Section 3, this reason ignores the fact that one loses 
almost one half of fresh spells (i.e. those starting after the beginning of the sample) by using only the 
last month data.  Further, we show below that information on the timing of transitions that occur in 
months other than the last month is lost, potentially introducing severe distortions to the true 
employment and welfare participation patterns.  Second, it is argued that using only the last month is 
preferable because many of the transitions in months other than the last month are likely to be due 
to imputation.3 However, for the time period we consider (1986-1993 SIPP panels), we find that 
about 80% of the transitions in the imputed data are reported to have occurred in the last (seam) 
month, while 50% of the transitions in the non-imputed data are reported to have taken place in the 
last month.   
We propose a parametric approach to correct for seam bias in a duration model setting and 
use maximum likelihood to estimate the model. Our approach is most similar in spirit to that used by 
Pischke (1995) for continuous variables.  We first develop a monthly discrete time duration model 
with parameters representing the propensity to under-report transitions in each of the first three 
months of the reference period by allocating them to the last month of the previous wave. (This 
form of misreporting will occur if respondents simply replace their actual employment status in the 
first three months of a wave with their month 4 employment status.) This form of misreporting is 
consistent with the findings of previous researchers on seam bias, including Goudreau, Oberheu and 
Vaughan 1984, who link AFDC income reporting in the Income Survey Development Program data 
to administrative records. We show that this model is identified without restricting the form of the 
duration dependence for fresh spells, but that this is not true for left-censored spells (i.e. spells which 
are in progress at the start of the sample). Thus we assume that left-censored employment (non-
employment) spells and fresh employment (non-employment) spells share the same misreporting 
parameters when we estimate a multiple-state, multiple-spell model of employment dynamics. Our 
                                                 
3 For example, Grogger (2004, p.674) states “... some of the within-wave transitions that exist are due to the 
SIPP imputation procedures rather than changes in behavior (Westat 2001).   Since most transitions are 
reported to occur between waves, I only make use of data from month 4 of each wave.” 
   5
models explicitly allow for the fact that if seam bias causes the end month of a spell to be 
mismeasured, it also causes the start month of the next spell to be mismeasured.  
Next we consider three richer misreporting models to shed light on the underlying causes of 
seam effects. First, we consider the case where the misreporting probability varies with demographic 
characteristics. Second, we allow for the possibility that a fraction of people never misreport, and 
finally, we also let this fraction depend on demographics. The first richer model indicates Whites 
have a significantly lower probability of misreporting.  This is consistent with the pattern found by 
Kalton and Miller (1991) for misreporting of a known Social Security payment increase in the SIPP 
1984 panel and with the findings of Black, Sanders, and Taylor (2003) on education misreporting in 
the Census.  
For comparison we also carry out the estimation of the duration models using two of the 
alternative models discussed previously: i) using only the last month data and ii) putting a dummy for 
the last month observations in the hazard and then adjusting the constant using the coefficient of this 
dummy variable.4  We find that there are important differences between our seam bias estimates and 
those obtained with a last month dummy, and very important differences between our seam bias 
estimates and those obtained using the last month data. We find a number of interesting empirical 
results concerning the employment dynamics of disadvantaged women. For example, we estimate the 
effect of changes in several policy and macro variables on the short term, intermediate term and long 
term fraction of time during which a woman is employed. These changes include states implementing 
positive incentives to leave welfare (“carrots”), changes in the overall unemployment rate or welfare 
benefits in states, states introducing punitive incentives to leave welfare (“sticks”), and changes in the 
minimum wage.  Intriguingly, the first three changes have statistically significant effects in the 
expected direction while the last two changes do not. A small number of empirical studies (for 
example, Ashenfelter and Card 1981, Currie and Fallick 1996 and Campolieti, Fang and Gunderson 
2005) have used individual panel data sets to estimate minimum wage effects on employment 
transition probabilities, and they mainly focus on the minimum wage effects on transitions out of 
employment.  Our findings regarding the minimum wage are particularly notable because our models 
have taken into consideration the minimum wage effects on transitions out of and into employment 
simultaneously.   
We find that when the overall unemployment rate increases: i) the hazard function for   
leaving left-censored and fresh non-employment spells falls; ii) the hazard function for leaving fresh 
employment spells increases; but iii) the hazard function for leaving a left-censored employment spell 
                                                 
4 Previous researchers who used the month 4 dummy variable method did not adjust the constant. Not making 
this adjustment will lead to an underestimate of the hazard function at each duration.   6
is unaffected. Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) argue that that the higher unemployment rate during 
a recession is due to both longer unemployment spells (i.e. the non-employment hazards fall) and 
more unemployment spells (i.e. the employment hazards rise); Shimer (2005a, 2005b) argues that 
only the first effect occurs. None of these studies control for individual heterogeneity; when we do 
so and thus take into account changes in the composition of those in employment and non-
employment over the business cycle, we find both of these positions continue to have merit. 
Of course, as with any study using a parametric model, there is the issue of whether we have 
the right model of misreporting behavior. To address this concern, we estimate several variants of 
our base model. In addition, there are several pieces of indirect evidence supporting our model.  First, 
the telescoping behavior underlying all of our misreporting models is exactly the type of behavior 
that the 2004 revision of the SIPP aimed to minimize.  Second, the findings of several previous 
studies support our model of misreporting behavior and our finding of a higher misreporting 
probability for minorities.  Finally, we consider three alternative models of misreporting, but reject 
them on the basis of aggregate data from the SIPP. Thus we consider a wide range of possible 
behavior and find substantial support for our modeling strategy. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the SIPP data and the extent of the 
seam bias problem. In Section 3 we discuss the problems that occur when one uses only the last 
month observations. In Section 4 we present our seam bias correction approach. We first outline the 
assumptions underlying our parametric approach, which we believe to be reasonable. We then 
outline our approach for estimating parametric single spell duration models in the presence of seam 
bias and discuss identification of these models. Finally, we consider the estimation of multi-spell, 
multi-state duration models with seam bias correction.  We present our empirical results in Section 5 
and conclude the paper in Section 6. 
 
2.    Seam Bias and the SIPP Data 
Our primary data consist of the 1986-1993 panels of the SIPP.  The SIPP was designed to 
provide detailed information on incomes and income sources, as well as on labor force and program 
participation, of U.S. individuals and households. Our sample is restricted to single mothers who 
have at most twelve years of schooling. Since we investigate employment status, we only consider 
women between the ages of 16 and 55.5  Although researchers investigating welfare durations often 
smooth out one-month spells, we use the original data with all one-month spells intact because 
employment status is often very unstable among low-educated women and it is common for them to 
                                                 
5 Respondents are chosen based on their education and age at the beginning of the panel. If a single mother 
marries in the middle of the survey, we keep the observations before the marriage and treat the spell in 
progress at the time of marriage as right-censored.   7
have very short employment and non-employment spells.6  Since we use state level variables such as 
maximum welfare benefits, minimum wage rates, unemployment rates, and whether the state 
obtained a welfare waiver and introduced positive incentives to leave welfare (carrots) or negative 
incentives to leave (sticks), we exclude women from the smaller states which are not separately 
identified in the SIPP. 
The SIPP uses a rotation group design, with each rotation group consisting of about a 
quarter of the entire panel, randomly selected.  For each calendar month, members of one rotation 
group are interviewed about the previous four months (the reference period or wave), and all 
rotation groups are interviewed over the course of any four month period.  Calendar months are thus 
equally distributed among the months of the reference period. We call the four months within each 
reference period month 1, month 2, month 3 and month 4. We will also refer to month 4 as the last month.  
The rotation design guarantees that approximately 25% of transitions should occur in months 1, 2, 3 
and 4 respectively. Summary statistics show that for our sample more than 45.86% of job transitions 
(from non-employment to employment and vice-versa) are reported to occur in month 4, the last 
m o n t h .   T h i s  n u m b e r  i s  f a r  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  25% one would expect.  This seam effect, which 
researchers have attributed to both too much change across waves and too little change within waves, 
is observed for most variables in the SIPP (see, e.g. Young 1989, Marquis and Moore 1990, 
Ryscavage 1988 and Moore 2008).7   
As noted earlier, some, e.g. Grogger, have expressed concern that many of the off-seam 
transitions are simply the result of an imputation procedure by the Census Bureau, making their use 
suspect. In the SIPP, monthly data are imputed when a sample member either refuses to be 
interviewed or is unavailable for that interview (and a proxy interview cannot be obtained), or when 
someone who enters a sample household after the start of the panel leaves the household during the 
reference period.8   The Census Bureau indicates whether a monthly observation is imputed using a 
                                                 
6 Hamersma (2006) investigates a unique Wisconsin administrative data set containing information from all 
Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and Welfare-to-Work (WtW) Tax Credit applications. The majority of 
WOTC-certified workers in Wisconsin are either welfare recipients or food stamp recipients. She finds that 
over one-third of certified workers have fewer than 120 annual hours of employment (job duration), while 
another 29 percent of workers have fewer than 400 annual hours. Only a little over one-third of workers have 
annual employment of more than 400 hours. These administrative data show that a significant share of 
employment spells are less than one month among disadvantaged individuals.  In our data it makes surprisingly 
little difference whether or not we smooth out the one-month spells.   
7 An experimental study of seam effects (Rips, Conrad, and Fricker 2003) suggests that seam effects may arise 
from respondents forgetting the timing of events together with “constant wave responding” in which 
respondents simply give the same answer for all four months of a wave. 
8 All adults in sampled households at the start of the panel are considered original sample members and are 
followed to any new address.  Someone entering a sample household after the start of the panel is interviewed 
as a member of the household, but not followed if he or she leaves.  In that case, the remaining months of a 
reference period after the departure will be imputed.   8
variable INTVW, which equals 1 or 2 if a self or proxy interview is obtained (and hence the data are 
not imputed) and 3 or 4 if the respondent refuses to be interviewed or left, respectively (and hence 
the data are imputed).  Using this variable, we compare the frequency of transitions at the seam in the 
imputed and non-imputed data (see Appendix Table A1).  We find that approximately 50% of the 
transitions take place in month 4 in the non-imputed data, but about 81% take place in month 4 in 
the imputed data. That is, imputation accentuates seam bias rather than ameliorates it, negating part 
of the argument for omitting data on the first three months of a wave. 
In our examination of employment dynamics using the SIPP, we follow Heckman and 
Singer (1984a) and the standard duration literature and distinguish between left-censored spells, 
which are in progress at the start of the sample, and fresh spells which begin after the start of the 
sample, for time spent both in and out of employment.9 The left-censored spells constitute the great 
majority of all spells in our data. For example, even in month 30 of the various SIPP samples, i.e. two 
and half years after the samples began, left-censored spells still constitute over sixty percent of both 
employment and non-employment spells. This raises two issues. First, using only fresh spells will not 
give an accurate picture of the employment dynamics of a typical woman in our sample, who is in a 
left-censored spell. Second, there is likely to be an important issue of selection in which women are 
observed in a fresh spell. Thus we analyze left-censored and fresh spells jointly to correct for this 
selection.10  
Table 1 provides summary statistics (for the first month of each spell) for our sample of 
employment and non-employment spells.  Panel A shows that single mothers in left-censored non-
employment spells are usually more disadvantaged than those in fresh non-employment spells. 
Specifically, those in left-censored non-employment spells are more likely to be minorities, less likely 
to have a full twelve years of schooling, less likely to have had a previous marriage, and are more 
likely to be disabled or have missing disability information than those in fresh non-employment spells.  
Also, the single mothers in left-censored non-employment spells tend to have more children, and 
their youngest children tend to be younger, compared to those in fresh non-employment spells. The 
two groups are similar in terms of age. 
Panel B shows that those in left-censored employment spells tend to be less disadvantaged 
than those in fresh employment spells. Specifically, they are older, less likely to be minority group 
members, more likely to have twelve years of schooling, more likely to have had a previous marriage, 
                                                 
9 Left-censored spells are sometimes called interrupted spells. 
10 While this selection bias may be important in principle, in practice Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde (1997) 
found it was not important in analyzing employment dynamics for similar women using data from the National 
Job Training Partnership Act Study.   9
less likely to be disabled or have missing disability information, and tend to have both fewer children 
and older children than those in fresh employment spells.  
 
3.  Problems in Measuring Spells Using Only the Last Month Observations 
As noted above, a common approach to the problem of seam bias is to use only the 
observations from the last month of the reference periods.  Under this approach spells are 
constructed by acting as if we observe only the last month data for each wave. When there is a status 
change from the previous month 4 to the current month 4, month 4 of the current wave is coded as 
the end of a spell.  Here we construct three examples representative of our data to illustrate the 
problems that may arise when adopting this approach.  In these examples, which are shown in 
Figures 1.1 – 1.3, we let  ,' , UU E  and  ' E denote a fresh non-employment spell, a left-censored non-
employment spell, a fresh employment spell and a left-censored employment spell, respectively.  In 
each figure, the numbers above the line indicate the survey months and the numbers below the line 
represent the reference period months.  The first example illustrated in Figure 1.1 assumes that a 
respondent has four spells. The first spell is a left-censored non-employment spell ending in a month 
1, the second is a fresh employment spell ending in a month 3, the third is a fresh non-employment 
spell ending in another month 3, and the last spell is a right-censored fresh employment spell. Using 
only the last month data, we would treat this respondent’s work history as consisting of a left-
censored non-employment spell lasting 32 months and a right-censored employment spell lasting 
four months.  We would lose both a two-month fresh employment spell and a 24-month fresh non-
employment spell. In addition, we would miscalculate the spell length of both the left-censored and 
right-censored spells.   
The next example, illustrated in Figure 1.2, shows that using only the last month data may 
lead to spell lengths being miscalculated, but does not necessarily lead to omission of spells. In Figure 
1.2 we keep everything else the same as in Figure 1.1 and only shift the ending point of the second 
spell, which is also the starting point of the third spell.  Now the second fresh employment spell lasts 
for five months with a month 4 in the middle of the spell.  For such a case, using only last month 
data would not lead to the omission of the second and third spells, but only to the miscalculation of 
the length of all four spells.   
Finally, we construct our last example to show how we can actually misclassify the type of a 
spell using only the last month data. Assume that a respondent has three spells as in Figure 1.3. The 
first spell is a left-censored non-employment spell ending in month 3 of the first reference period; 
the second is a completed fresh employment spell; and the third is a fresh non-employment spell 
censored at the end of the sample. Using only last month data we would record her work history as a   10
left-censored employment spell and a fresh non-employment spell. From this example it is clear that 
we will lose all left-censored spells less than or equal to three months in length by switching to the 
last month data. In addition, using the last month data may lead to both miscalculating spell length 
and even misclassifying spell type for left-censored spells. 
To recap, the above three examples show that by using only the last month data, we could 
lose some spells, miscalculate the length of spells, and misclassify the spell type. Further, the problem 
is more severe with short spells that are less than four months duration and that do not cover a 
month 4. From these examples it appears to be ambiguous whether using only the last month data 
will overestimate or underestimate the average duration. It is clear that in general using only the last 
month observations will lead to an overestimate of the length of left-censored spells.  However, for 
fresh spells, using only the last month data may underestimate or overestimate the length of an 
observed fresh spell, since both the start and finish of a fresh spell could be mismeasured due to 
seam bias.   
Of course, the above three examples compare the last month data to the true duration data, 
while in practice we do not know the true duration of spells. Thus the relevant comparison is the last 
month data versus the monthly data contaminated by seam bias, as some researchers only use the last 
month because of the seam bias. Here we would make two points. First, even in the presence of 
seam bias we still observe many short spells in our data, including spells falling between two 
interviews as in Figure 1.1.11  If some short spells are omitted due to seam bias, switching to using 
only the last month data certainly will not help us capture those omitted short spells. Second, the 
implications of Figures 1.1 to 1.3 also hold for comparisons of estimates based on the monthly data 
contaminated by seam bias (the SIPP data) and estimates based on only the last month observations 
from the contaminated data. 
To shed more light on the comparison between the contaminated monthly data and the last 
month only data, we examine the number of completed spells and the empirical survivor functions 
for each data type.  First, comparing the number of completed spells (which provide the empirical 
identification for the parameters of the hazard functions), we find that shift from using monthly data 
to the last month data results in the loss of about 47% of fresh employment spells, 48% of fresh 
non-employment spells, 20% of left-censored employment spells, and 18% of left-censored non-
employment spells.  Second, when considering all spells (completed spells and right-censored spells), 
shifting from monthly data to the last month data still results in the loss of 34 to 35 percent of fresh 
spells. (See online Appendix Table A2, which presents distributions of spell length and total number 
                                                 
11 An accurate measure of the frequency with which individuals fail to report short spells can only be obtained 
from matched administrative-survey data, which we do not have for this sample.   11
of spells of monthly data versus last month data for all spells.12)  However, it is difficult to ascertain 
the effect of using the last month data on spell lengths from Table A2 because of the right censored 
spells. Instead, we investigate the empirical survivor functions.  Online Appendix Figures A.1 and 
A.2 show that using only the last month data will increase the estimated survivor function for left-
censored employment and non-employment spells by a considerable amount. Online Appendix 
Figures A.3 and A.4 show that this phenomenon is even more pronounced for fresh employment 
and non-employment spells.  
These calculations indicate that shifting from the contaminated (by seam bias) data to only 
the last month data leads to omitting spells and overestimating the spell length. Moreover, using only 
the last month data will lead to a loss of efficiency since data from three-fourths of the months are 
being discarded, and nearly 55 percent of transitions occur in these months. 
 
4.  Correcting for Seam Bias: A Parametric Approach 
We consider a model of misreporting behavior that allows us to save the valuable 
information contained in the monthly SIPP data and to address the seam bias problem. Specifically, 
we first develop a monthly single state discrete time duration model with three extra parameters that 
capture the misreporting of transitions.13  Under reasonable assumptions ,  w e  s h o w  t h a t  w e  c a n  
identify these parameters in our model. We then consider the extension to multi-state multi-spell 
duration model. Since the model is significantly over identified, we are able to use this to consider 
several extensions of the model.  
 
4.1   Notation 
We first set up our notation before discussing our assumptions.  Let  () ,
obs M ml = represent 
a spell reported to end in month m  of reference period (wave) l .14 Note that  () ,
obs M ml =  could 
be misreported because of seam bias. Further, let  ( ) ,
true M ml =  represent the fact that a spell truly 
ended in month m  of reference period l .  The variable m  in 
obs M and 
true M  assumes five possible 
values: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 0, where m=1, 2, 3 or 4 indicates a transition in months 1, 2, 3 or 4, respectively,  
and  0 m =  indicates a right-censored spell ending with the survey.  For our sample l  takes on the 
values from 1 to L, where L is the number of waves, which depends on the specific SIPP panel 
                                                 
12 The numbers of spells in the table are larger than those in Table 1 because here we have not imposed the 
selection criteria discussed in Section 2.  The online Appendix is available at http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/~xli. 
13 See Romeo (2001) for a very different approach to dealing with seam bias in a duration model. 
14 The end of a spell can occur either because a transition took place or because the individual reached the end 
of the sample period.   12
being used.15  For example,   (4,4)
obs M =  indicates that a transition was reported to have occurred 
in month 4 of reference period 4, while  (3,5)
true M = denotes that the transition actually occurred in 
month 3 of reference period 5.  
 
4.2 Behavioral  Assumptions 
As discussed in the introduction, seam bias is observed for many variables in the SIPP. The 
employment status variable we use to construct our measure of transitions is no exception. This 
constancy within waves of employment status in the SIPP is plausibly a feature of the interview 
structure. The respondent is first asked whether she had a job or business at any time during the 
previous four-month period; if the answer is yes, the respondent is then asked whether she had a job 
or business during all weeks of the period. Further questions are asked of individuals who report 
some time employed and some time not employed. This serves to determine the timing of their 
periods of employment and non-employment.  For example, suppose an individual continues a spell 
of non-employment into a given wave and does not have a job for months 1 and 2 of the new wave, 
but she gets a job in month 3 that continues into month 4 of the wave. Given the interview structure, 
this individual may report that she has a job for the whole wave based on the fact she has a job in 
month 4, which is the month closest to (right before) the interview month.  For this particular 
example, a non-employment spell ending in month 2 of the current reference period will be reported 
to end in month 4 of the previous reference period.  Goudreau, Oberheu and Vaughan (1984) 
document this as the most common type of misreporting behavior for AFDC benefits in the Income 
Survey Development Program.16 
Based on the interview structure, documented empirical evidence of seam bias in SIPP 
variables, and previous research based on survey and administrative data, we make the following 
main assumption: respondents sometimes move a transition in months 1, 2 or 3 of a given reference 
period to month 4 of the previous reference period.  This shifting of transitions will occur if 
respondents sometimes report the employment status of month 4 for all months in the reference 
period. In terms of labor market state, this reflects the well-known phenomenon of telescoping 
(respondents recall that previous states are the same as the state in the current period, Sudman and 
Bradburn 1974, p.69), while in terms of transitions, it reflects the well-known phenomenon of 
“reverse telescoping” of transitions (respondents recall transitions as having occurred more distantly 
than in fact was the case, Lemaitre 1992).  This is also similar to the third type of household behavior 
                                                 
15 There are seven waves in the 1986 and 1987 panels, six in the 1988 panel, eight in the 1990 and 1991 panels, 
ten in the 1992 panel, and nine in the 1993 panel. 
16 Their study is conducted by comparing respondents’ reports obtained from interviews with administrative 
record information.   13
considered by Pischke (1995, p.824), where he assumes that respondents report their permanent 
income (but not transitory income) in month 4 as applying to all months in the wave. We make the 
following five assumptions for each interview:  
A1) the respondents report all transitions that occurred during reference period l  as occurring either 
in the true month or month 4 of reference period   1 l − ;  
A2) if a respondent reports that a transition happened in months 1, 2 or 3 of a reference period, it is 
a truthful report;  
A3) a respondent reports a transition that actually occurred in months 1, 2 or 3 of reference period l  
as taking place in month 4 of reference period  1 l −   with some pre-specified (but unknown) 
probabilities  12 , γ γ and 3 γ ; 
A4) if a transition truly happened in month 4 of a reference period, the respondent reports it as 
occurring in that month; and 
A5) the true transition rate for a given duration does not depend on the reference period month, 
m .17  
Given these behavioral assumptions,18 we have the following conditional probabilities:   
( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0       1, 2,3;
obs true PM m lM m l m =≠ = =   (4.1)                   
( ) (4, 1) ( , )          1, 2,3;
obs true
m PM l M m l m γ =− = = =  (4.2)   
( ) (4, ) (4, ) 1; 
obs true PM lM l == =                (4.3) 
( ) ( 0 ,) ( 0 ,) 1  .
obs true PM lM l == =                (4.4) 
 
4.3   Correcting for Seam Bias in a Single Spell Model 
To illustrate the method in the simplest way, we first explore the problem involving a single 













     (4.5) 
                                                 
17 This assumption is the consequence of the survey design. For ease of interviewing, the entire sample is 
randomly split into four rotation groups, and one rotation group (1/4 of the sample) is interviewed each 
calendar month.  Each rotation group in a SIPP panel is interviewed once every four months about 
employment and program participation during the previous four months. 
18 Our assumptions rule out the possibility that individuals forget about very short spells that fall between two 
interviews.  As discussed before, without administrative data linked to the SIPP data we have no way of 
verifying the truth of this assumption.   14
where t  denotes current duration,  () ht  denotes duration dependence, τ  denotes the calendar time 
of the start of the spell (τ  is suppressed in the following expressions), and  () i X t τ + denotes a 
(possibly) time changing explanatory variable. Further,  i θ  denotes unobserved heterogeneity, and 
following Heckman and Singer (1984b), we assume that it is i.i.d. across i and is drawn from a 
discrete distribution function with points of support  11 ,..., , J J θ θθ −   and associated probabilities 











19 For example, if a spell lasts K  months, the contribution to the 
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For notational simplicity, we drop the individual subscript i  in what follows. 
Based on our behavioral assumptions, it is straightforward to derive the likelihood function 
given that we observe  ( ) ,
obs M ml = , and the reported length of the spell, 
obs dur , both of which 
potentially have been contaminated by seam bias.20  The contribution to the likelihood function for a 
completed spell of observed length K  that ends in month 1 of reference period l  is given by: 
( ) ( )
() () () () () ()
1, ,
1, , 1, , 1, , 1, , .      
obs obs
obs true true obs true true
P M l dur K
P M l M l dur K P M l M l dur K
==
= = == + = ≠≠
 
Since the second term is zero by assumption A2, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () () ()
() 1
1, , 1, , 1, ,
1, | 1, , 1,
1( ) ,
obs obs obs true true
obs true true true true true
P M l dur K P M l M l dur K
P M l M l dur K P M l dur K P dur K
LK γ
== = = ==
== = = ⋅= = ⋅ =
=−
  
  (4.7) 
In (4.7) we have used the implication of assumption A3 that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1, | 1, , 1 .
obs true true P M l M l dur K γ == = = −  
Moreover, 
() ( ) 1, 1
true true PM ld u r K == =  and  ( ) () .
true Pd u r K LK ==   
Similarly, if a transition is reported to end in month 2 or month 3 of reference period l , and to have 
lasted for K  months, we have 
                                                 
19 Our analysis is equally applicable to any other choice for the discrete time hazard function. 
20 Here we assume that seam bias affects only the end date, and not the start date, of a spell. We relax this 
assumption when we consider multiple spell data.   15
() () () ( ) 2 2, , 1
obs obs PM l d u r K LK γ == = − ⋅  and  (4.8) 
() ( ) ( ) 3 3, , = (1 ) .
obs obs PM l d u r K LK γ == − ⋅    (4.9) 
Finally, the contribution to the likelihood function of a completed spell of observed length K  that is 
observed to end in month 4 of reference period l  is given by 
( ) ( )
() ( ) () () ( ) ()
() ( ) () () () ()
() ( ) () ()
4, ,
4, , 1, 1 , 1 4, , 2, 1 , 2
4, , 3, 1 , 3 4, , 4, ,
4, | 1, 1 , 1 1, 1
obs obs
obs true true obs true true
obs true true obs true true
obs true true true
P M l dur K
P M l M l dur K P M l M l dur K
P M l M l dur K P M l M l dur K
P M l M l dur K P M l dur
==
= = = + =++ = = + =++
== + = + + == =
== = + = + ⋅= + () ()
() ( ) () () () ()
() ( ) () () () ()
() () ()
11
4, | 2, 1 , 2 2, 1 2 2
4, | 3, 1 , 3 3, 1 3 3
4, | 4, , 4,
true true
obs true true true true true
obs true true true true true
obs true true true
K P dur K
M l M l dur K P M l dur K P dur K
M l M l dur K P M l dur K P dur K
M l M l dur K P M
= +⋅ =+
+= = + = + ⋅ = + = + ⋅ = +
+ = = + =+⋅ = + =+⋅ =+
+= = = ⋅ = () () () .
true true l dur K P dur K =⋅ =
Note that  ( ) ( ) ( ) 4, | 4, , 1
obs true true PM l M l d u r K == = =  by assumption A4, and 
() () ( ) 4, , 1 , , 1,2,3,
obs true true
j PM l M jl d u r K j j γ == + = + = =  by assumption  A3. Thus the 
contribution of a spell that ends in month 4 of wave l is  
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 3 4, , 1 2 3 .
obs obs PM l d u r K LK LK LK LK γγ γ == = + + + + + +  (4.10) 
  A natural question to ask is whether the model is identified without restricting the form of 
the duration dependence. In Appendix 1 we show that a model with only duration dependence and 
misreporting parameters is (over) identified for fresh employment and non-employment spells, but is 
not identified for left-censored employment and non-employment spells, assuming that each type of 
spell has entirely different misreporting and duration dependence parameters. However, we also 
show that all parameters are identified if we assume that left-censored employment (non-
employment) spells and fresh employment (non-employment) spells share the same misreporting 
parameters, and thus we make this assumption below.  
  We also consider models where the misreporting probabilities depend on individual 
characteristics. For example, suppose the probabilities differ among Whites and non-Whites (African 
Americans and Hispanics). We now assume that the misreporting probability in reference period 
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where  NW a dummy variable is equal to 1 if an individual is non-White and zero otherwise. We use 
an analogous specification for non-employment spells. Since one could estimate this model by simply 
estimating the base model separately for Whites and non-Whites with constant misreporting 
probabilities, and then use a minimum distance procedure to estimate the parameters in (4.11), this 
extended model is also identified. Below we find that the misreporting probabilities indeed vary 
significantly by race. Interestingly, the misreporting probabilities do not vary by level of education, 
independent of whether we let the misreporting probabilities depend on race. 
 
4.4  Correcting for Seam Bias in a Multiple Spell Model  
In a multiple spell discrete time duration model, correcting for seam bias complicates the 
likelihood function dramatically since adjusting a response error in one spell involves shifting not 
only the end of the current spell but also the start of the subsequent spell.  This is a serious problem 
as respondents in our sample have up to seven spells and a respondent can have several spells ending 
in month 4 in her history.  
We estimate a discrete time duration model with multiple spells, duration dependence and 
unobserved heterogeneity. Due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and the lack of 
information on the start date, it is extremely complicated to derive the density function for time 
remaining in a left-censored spell using the same parameters as for fresh spells. Thus we continue to 
use separate hazard functions for the left-censored spells (Heckman and Singer 1984a).  We allow the 
unobserved heterogeneity terms to be correlated across different types of spells.  
As noted above, for identification we let the employment spells, both left-censored and fresh, 
share one set of seam bias parameters,  12 ,
EE γ γ , and 3
E γ  as defined in equation (4.2), while we specify 
another set of parameters,  12 ,
UU γ γ and  3
U γ , which represent the seam bias associated with non-
employment spells.  As defined in Section 3, we let  ' U  and U  represent left-censored and fresh 
non-employment spells respectively, and let  ' E and E  represent left-censored and fresh employment 
spells respectively. 21   We follow standard practice and specify the unobserved heterogeneity 
corresponding to these four types of spells through a vector  '' (, ,, ) UU EE θ θθθθ = , and assume that 
θ  is distributed independently across individuals and is fixed across spells for a given individual.  
Following McCall (1996) we let θ  follow a discrete distribution with points of support  12 , ,..., J θ θθ , 
                                                 
21 As we show in the previous section, we cannot let the seam bias parameters differ between left-censored and 
fresh spells of the same type.   17
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The following discussion is based on the relatively simple example in Figure 2, which covers 
all essential problems for multiple spells with seam bias. To distinguish among the four types of 
spells, we add a subscript to the transition indicators defined in Section 4.1 and duration indicators 
defined in Section 4.3. In Figure 2, the respondent reports three spells with a reporting history given 
by  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } '' 1,2 , 5, 4,3 , 7, 0,9 , 24
obs obs obs obs obs obs
UU E E U U M dur M dur M dur == == == , which indicates 
that the first spell is a left-censored non-employment spell ending in month 1 of reference period 2, 
the second is a fresh employment spell reported to end in month 4 of reference period 3, and the 
third is a fresh non-employment spell which is censored at the end of the sample. (Again in Figure 2 
the numbers above the line are the survey months and the numbers below the line are reference 
period months.) Since the first spell ends in month 1 of the reference period, we assume it is 
reported correctly. However, the second spell is reported to have ended in month 4 of the third 
reference period. Given our assumptions the reported history could be true, but there are also three 
additional possible histories A, B, and C as illustrated in Figure 2. Specifically, the second spell could 
actually have ended in month 1 of the following reference period, which implies that we would need 
to reduce the duration of the subsequent (censored) spell by one month. Alternatively, it also could 
have ended in months 2 or 3 of the following reference period, in which case we would need to 
shorten the length of the subsequent spell by two or three months respectively.    
As we show in our Online Appendix 2, the contribution to the likelihood function for the 
reported history in Figure 2 is given by 22 
                                                 
22 Grogger (2004) suggests clustering the spells for the same individual in addition to allowing for person-
specific unobserved heterogeneity to obtain robust standard errors. We do not follow this approach since the 
parameter estimates will not be consistent if there is spell-specific heterogeneity that is not taken into account 
in estimation.   18
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Finally, we also consider an extended model to allow for the possibility that a fraction of the 
sample never misreports.  Specifically, we assume that there are two types of people: type A 
individuals who always truthfully report their employment histories, and type B individuals who 
misreport in the way described in Section 4.2 above. Type A people comprise a fraction  A P  of the 
population, but of course we cannot discern types in our sample. If an individual is a type A person, 
she will have the standard multiple-state, multiple-spell likelihood function, see e.g. Eberwein, Ham 
and LaLonde (1997). If she is a type B person, her likelihood would be the appropriate seam bias 
likelihood such as (4.12) above. Since we do not know what type of person each individual is, a 
representative individual’s contribution to the likelihood function is  
() () ( ) ( ) 1.
AB
AA LP L P L ⋅= ⋅+ − ⋅  (4.13)                               
Maximizing the log likelihood based on (4.13) involves estimating only one additional 
parameter, A P .23  
  For both of our models (represented in (4.12) and (4.13)), we consider two alternatives: i) the 
misreporting probabilities ( 's γ  and  A P ) are constant for the whole sample; and ii) the misreporting 
probabilities ( 's γ  and  A P ) vary by individual demographics taking the form of equation (4.11).  For 





                                                 
23 Care must be exercised if one wants to test the null hypothesis 1 A P = , both because it is on the boundary of 
the parameter space, and because the misreporting parameters   's γ   are not identified under this null 
hypothesis (Davies 1987). Fortunately the estimate of  A P  is quite far from 1 in our case.    19
4.5  Using Aggregated Data to Consider Additional Misclassification Schemes 
  Of course, there is the possibility that the transitions are misclassified in a way that differs 
from the scenarios considered above. Here we consider several other possibilities which we argue can 
be rejected based on aggregates of our micro data. The first possibility we consider is: some of the 
month 1 transitions are pushed into month 2, some of the month 2 transitions are pushed into 
month 3, and some of the month 3 transitions are pushed into month 4, but none of the month 4 
transitions are pushed into the next reference period (because it is the last month in the reference 
period). If 50% of the transitions in months 1, 2 and 3 are pushed to the next month, then we would 
see 12.5 % of the transitions in month 1, 25% in month 2, 25% in month 3, and 37.5% in month 4. 
Alternatively, suppose 75% of the transitions get pushed out of months 1, 2, and 3. Then we would 
see 6.25% of the transitions in month 1, 25% in month 2, 25% in month 3, and 43.75% in month 4. 
In either case, month 1 should have a considerably smaller proportion of the transitions than months 
2 and 3, and month 4 should have a considerably larger proportion of the transitions than months 2 
and 3. However, in our data, months 1, 2, 3, and 4 have 16.57%, 19.08%, 18.49%, and 45.86% of the 
employment/non-employment transitions respectively, which is clearly inconsistent with this 
alternative model. (Note that our assumptions in Section 4.2 are consistent with this pattern).  
  Secondly, we consider the possibility that some of the transitions in month 1 of the 
reference period  1 l +  are pushed back into month 4 of reference period l . (Recall that month 1 of 
the reference period  1 l +  is the interview month for reference period l .) If this is the only source of 
misclassification, then the pattern should be similar to the scheme above: about 25% of the observed 
transitions are reported in months 2 and 3, a smaller proportion of transactions are reported in 
month 1, and a larger proportion in month 4. This model would also be rejected by the summary 
statistics presented in the previous paragraph. 
  A third possible explanation is that individuals may forget about a fraction of very short 
spells starting in reference period months 1, 2 and 3. In other words, the number of transitions in 
month 4 is accurately reported, but the numbers in months 1, 2 and 3 are under-reported. It is 
difficult to address the suggestion that individuals forget about some short spells starting in months 1, 
2 and 3 without access to linked administrative data, and certainly this explanation is consistent with 
the aggregate data reported above. However, we can examine this explanation in another way. We 
know from administrative data that short spells are much more frequent in employment duration 
than in welfare duration for the disadvantaged single mothers we study. Thus if we compare the 
transitions in months 1, 2, 3 and 4 for employment duration data and welfare duration data we would 
expect to see a larger fraction of transitions in month 4 for the employment data if this explanation is 
correct.  However, we find that 52.7% of all transitions out of employment were reported to have   20
occurred in month 4, while 62.7% of all transitions out of welfare were reported to have occurred in 
month 4, casting doubt on this explanation.  
 
5.   Empirical Results  
5.1  Hazard Function Estimates from Four Seam Bias Correction Models 
  Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C present estimates of the parameters of the hazard functions for four 
models.  The first and second models are the seam bias corrections described in section 4.4 when the 
misreporting probabilities are constant across individuals (constant misreporting probability model hereafter) 
and variable across individuals (variable misreporting probability model hereafter) respectively.  The third 
model consists of adding a month 4 (last month of any reference period) dummy to the model (last 
month dummy model hereafter). The last model uses month 4 data only (last month data model hereafter).  
Estimates from the last month dummy and last month data models allow us to compare our 
approach with those that are currently used. All models are estimated with unobserved heterogeneity.  
We let the data choose the number of support points for the unobserved heterogeneity (as specified 
in Section 4.4) and the best fitting polynomials (in logarithms) for duration dependence according to 
the Schwartz criterion for each model, as suggested by Ham, Svejnar and Terrell (1998) and Baker 
and Melino (2000); this helps to avoid numerical instability problems that come from over-fitting the 
data. Although we do not focus on the duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution estimates, they affect our policy experiments, in which we examine the effect of changes 
in several different variables on the expected duration of a spell and the fraction of time spent in 
employment.  
  Tables 2A and 2B contain the hazard estimates for left-censored spells and fresh spells 
respectively. We believe the parameters of the hazard coefficients are of substantial interest since the 
employment dynamics of women with low levels of schooling have received much less attention in 
the literature than the welfare dynamics, despite their importance for determining which families will 
be in poverty. Table 2C reports the misreporting probabilities for our seam bias correction models.24 
  Our explanatory variables include a relatively standard mix of policy and demographic 
variables, except that we also use the minimum wage as an explanatory variable.  The hazard is 
parameterized such that a negative coefficient implies that the hazard decreases if the explanatory 
variable increases (see equation 4.5). Considering first our seam bias correction estimates with respect 
to left-censored non-employment spells in the first two columns of Table 2A, we see that higher 
                                                 
24Note that unlike the standard case, the log-likelihood function of our seam bias correction models does not 
become additively separable in the different types of spells even if we ignore unobserved heterogeneity, or 
restrict the unobserved heterogeneity to be independent across spell type, because we still must allow for seam 
bias.   21
welfare benefits, a higher unemployment rate, being African American or Hispanic, being older, 
having never been married, having more children under six years of age, and having a disability all 
significantly lower the probability (in a partial correlation sense) that a woman leaves a left-censored 
non-employment spell. The minimum wage and the implementation of welfare waiver policies (sticks 
and carrots) at the state level have no significant effect on left-censored non-employment duration. 
On the other hand, having twelve years of schooling (as opposed to less schooling) significantly 
increases the probability of leaving such a spell. In terms of  left-censored employment spells (Table 
2A, columns 5 and 6), we see that higher welfare benefits, having twelve years of schooling, and 
being older are associated with significantly longer left-censored employment spells.  The sign for the 
welfare benefits variable is puzzling, but we will see in Table 3A (upper right panel) that the effects of 
increasing this benefits variable by 10% on the expected duration of left-censored employment spells 
are quite small and statistically insignificant for both the constant and variable misreporting 
probability models.  Being Hispanic, never having been married, having more children under age six, 
having a disability, or having missing disability status are associated with significantly shorter left-
censored employment spells. Again the minimum wage and the two welfare waiver variables have no 
significant effects.  
  Table 2B reports hazard estimates for fresh spells.  The fact that we have substantially fewer 
fresh employment and non-employment spells (see Table 1 for the number of spells) leads to fewer 
variables being statistically significant. For the fresh non-employment spells (columns 1 and 2), facing 
a higher unemployment rate, being African American, having more children under age eighteen, 
having more children under age six, having a disability or having missing disability status decreases 
the hazard rate for leaving a fresh non-employment spell.  Being offered a “carrot” to leave welfare 
significantly reduces the length of a fresh non-employment spell, as does having twelve years of 
schooling. Finally, when considering fresh employment spells (columns 5 and 6), the exit rate from 
these spells significantly decreases with an increase in the minimum wage, having twelve years of 
schooling and being older. On the other hand, an increase in welfare benefits, higher unemployment 
rate, and having a disability or missing disability status increase the exit rate from a fresh employment 
spell. For both constant and variable misreporting probability models, the Schwartz criterion 
indicates that  two support points for unobserved heterogeneity, a linear form (in the logarithm of 
spell duration) of duration dependence for left-censored spells and a quadratic form (in the logarithm 
of spell duration) of duration dependence for fresh spells are appropriate.  
  In the constant and variable misreporting probability models, the unemployment rate 
coefficients suggest that both left-censored and fresh non-employment durations increase with the 
overall unemployment rate. Further, as in Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009), the probability of   22
leaving a fresh employment spell increases with the overall unemployment rate, but as in Shimer 
(2005a, 2005b), the probability of leaving a left-censored employment spell is not affected by the 
business cycle. 
  Finally, we discuss the estimated misreporting probabilities from both of our models as 
presented in Table 2C. For the constant misreporting probability model, the misreporting 













constrain the probabilities to be between 0 and 1. For the variable misreporting probability model, 
the misreporting probabilities for employment spells are parameterized as in equation (4.11). We use 
analogous specifications for non-employment spells.  Note that given the above re-parameterization, 
an estimated 
E
k α  that is not significantly different from zero implies an estimated 
E
k γ  close to 0.5. In 
the variable misreporting model, we find that race is the only demographic variable that significantly 
affects misreporting behavior. Panel A of Table 2C reports parameter estimates of  's α  and Panel B 
reports calculated misreporting probabilities according to the estimates in Panel A. Standard errors in 
Panel B are calculated using the delta method. All of the misreporting probabilities are statistically 
and economically significant. In general, the misreporting probabilities are larger for the employment 
spells than for the non-employment spells.  Another interesting pattern is that the probabilities of 
misreporting are descending from month 1 through month 3. This pattern indicates that among all 
transitions occurring in months 1, 2 and 3, the longer the time distance between the transition and 
the interview, the more likely it is that the respondent heaps that transition into the previous month 4. 
(Recall that interviews were conducted in month 1 of the following reference period, thus month 1 
transitions occurred furthest from the interview time). According to the constant misreporting 
probability model, 56.8%, 45.6% and 44.1% of month 1, 2, and 3 transitions out of non-employment 
spells, respectively, have been shifted to month 4; while 72.9%, 60.1%, and 58.5% of month 1, 2, and 
3 transitions out of employment spells, respectively, have been shifted to month 4. 25 African 
Americans and Hispanics are more likely to misreport by about 7 to 8 percentage points for non-
employment spells and by about 7 to 10 percentage points for employment spells.  
  Interestingly, while we find significantly lower misreporting probabilities among Whites, the 
coefficients and significance levels are remarkably similar for the estimates of the parameters of the 
                                                 
25 We do not formally test the null hypothesis that all the misreporting probabilities are zero using a likelihood 
ratio test for two reasons. First, it is clear from the aggregate data that a model that does not account for seam 
bias in some way will fit the data poorly; i.e. the null hypothesis does not describe an interesting model. 
Secondly, if we were to test formally this null hypothesis, we would have to take into account that we are 
testing whether parameters are on the boundaries of the parameter space (in six dimensions), i.e. we are in a 
nonstandard testing situation.  Given the size of the estimated misreporting probabilities, testing whether they 
are zero does not seem very interesting and thus would not warrant dealing with the nonstandard testing issues.     23
hazard functions from the two (constant versus variable) misreporting models in Tables 2A and 2B. 
For the sole purpose of correcting for seam bias, our results suggest that a constant misreporting 
probability model will be sufficient. However, if a researcher is also interested in investigating 
misreporting behavior, a richer model allowing misreporting probability to vary with individual 
characteristics will be needed. 
  There are differences among the estimates based on our seam bias correction models and 
the estimates from the other two approaches in the literature, the last month dummy model and the 
last month data model, in terms of point estimates and standard errors.  Note that the magnitudes of 
the coefficients of the last month data model are not directly comparable with our seam bias 
correction models and the last month dummy variable model. For the seam bias correction models 
and the last month dummy variable model, the time unit for the discrete hazard is one month, while for 
the last month data model, the time unit for the discrete hazard is four months (refer to Section 3 for 
details of the spell construction for the last month data model).  However, here we compare signs as 
well as statistical significance across the four models, and then in the next section we compare the 
effect of changing explanatory variables on the expected durations of the individual spells for the 
four models, which takes into account different time intervals for the different hazards. 
Since empirical researchers typically focus only on estimates that are statistically significant, 
we compare differences in the significant coefficients produced by each model. First considering the 
left-censored non-employment spells in Table 2A (left panel), our seam bias approach finds 
significant effects of being African American, while this is not true for the simpler models. Further, 
all models except the last month data model find a significant effect of being Hispanic. On the other 
hand, the simpler models find a significant effect of having disability status missing, but this is not 
true for our seam bias models. Considering the estimates for the left-censored employment spells 
(right panel), the seam bias models find a significant effect for welfare benefits but the simpler 
models do not; the opposite is true for the unemployment rate and being African American. Finally 
while the seam bias models and the last month dummy variable model show significant effects for 
both the number of children less than 6 years old and the disability variable missing, this is not true 
for the last month data model.  As for the age of the youngest child variable, only the last month data 
model finds a significant effect.  
Considering the fresh non-employment spells (Table 2B, left panel), our seam bias models 
and the last month dummy variable model find significant roles for the unemployment rate, the 
welfare waiver carrot variable and being African American, while this is not true for the last month 
data approach. Welfare benefits are only significant using the last month dummy variable model, and 
the number of children less than 18 years is only significant for our seam bias models. Finally,   24
considering the fresh employment spells (Table 2B, right panel), we note that only our seam bias 
models find significant roles for the unemployment rate, the minimum wage and the disability 
variable missing, and only the last month data model finds a significant effect of being African 
American and having never been married. 
 
5.2  Expected Durations and the Effect of Changing an Explanatory Variable on 
Expected Durations 
To look at estimated effects which are comparable across the four models we first calculate 
expected durations and the effects of changing explanatory variables on the expected duration of 
each type of spell. Conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity, the probability that a spell of type  j, 
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We choose
* 60 T = .26  We calculate the expected durations for each individual and take the sample 
average. To test whether the out-of-sample durations are having a disproportionate impact on 
estimated expected duration, we also follow Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde (2002) and freeze the 
hazard function for durations longer than 15 months at 15 months for fresh spells and freeze the 
hazard function for durations longer than 25 months at 25 months for left-censored spells. We find 
that freezing the hazard function does not make a noticeable difference in estimated expected 
durations.  We also estimate the effect on expected duration if we change an explanatory variable for 
the four models. We set an explanatory variable at two different levels and calculate the 
                                                 
26 The longest panel in our data lasts 40 months.   25
corresponding expected durations; the difference between the two expected durations represents the 
effect of changing that particular explanatory variable on expected duration. Standard errors for 
expected durations and effects of changes in explanatory variables on expected duration are 
calculated using the delta method. 
Our estimated expected durations and the effects which changing explanatory variables have 
on expected duration are presented in Tables 3A and 3B.  Note that when we calculate the expected 
duration for the last month data model, we have taken into consideration that this model uses a four-
month hazard (compared with the other models’ monthly hazards), while when we calculate the 
expected duration for the last month dummy model, we add one-quarter of the last month dummy 
coefficient to each support point of unobserved heterogeneity. The first row of Table 3A reports the 
expected durations (without freezing the duration function for longer spells).  The expected 
durations for left-censored spells, both employment and non-employment, are comparable across the 
four models, with those from the last month dummy variable model being slightly shorter.  For fresh 
spells, the expected durations are quite similar between the constant and variable misreporting 
probability models as both are about 11 to 12 months.  However the estimates from the last month 
data model are much larger: the expected fresh non-employment duration is about 23 months and 
the expected fresh employment duration is about 33 months.  The estimates from the last month 
dummy variable model are between those from our misreporting probability models and the last 
month data model, with the expected fresh non-employment duration being about 16 months and 
the expected fresh employment duration being about 28 months.  The longer expected durations for 
fresh spells estimated from the last month data model can at least be partly explained by the loss of 
short fresh spells (as discussed in Section 3).  
The rest of Table 3A presents the effects of changes in welfare policy variables or 
macroeconomic conditions on expected durations. We first discuss the effects for left-censored non-
employment spells (top left panel). Increasing state maximum welfare benefits by 10% lengthens left-
censored non-employment spells by around half a month in all models, although this effect is not 
statistically significant in the last month data model. We do not find statistically significant effects of 
implementing welfare carrot or stick waivers; moreover there is not a statistically significant effect of 
increasing the minimum wage by 10%. If the state overall unemployment rate increases by 25% (i.e. 
from 6% to 7.5%), the expected duration of left-censored non-employment spells increases by about 
1.4 to 1.8 months. None of the above variables have a precisely estimated effect in any model for 
left-censored employment spells (top right panel).  
Next we discuss the estimated effects for fresh non-employment spells (bottom left panel). 
Increasing the state maximum welfare benefit by 10% has a very small positive effect, and it is   26
statistically significant only for the last month dummy variable model. Implementing a carrot waiver 
policy reduces the expected duration by 3 to 4 months, but this effect is not statistically significant 
for the last month data model. Neither implementing a stick waiver policy nor increasing the 
minimum wage has a statistically distinguishable effect on the expected duration. If the state 
unemployment rate increases by 25%, the expected duration increases, in this case by about 0.8 to 1.2 
months. This effect is not significant for the last month data model.  
Lastly we discuss the effects on fresh employment spells (bottom right panel). The constant 
and variable misreporting probability models and the last month dummy model estimate significant 
effects of increasing the state maximum welfare benefits by 10%, reducing the expected duration by 
0.2 to 0.4 months.  None of the four models precisely estimate any effects of the two welfare policies, 
carrot and stick waivers. Only the constant and variable misreporting probability models estimate 
significant effects of increasing the minimum wage by 10%, with the change increasing the expected 
duration by about 1.5 months. Finally, the constant and variable misreporting probability models 
predict that increasing the unemployment rate by 25% reduces the expected duration by about 0.7 of 
a month while this effect is statistically insignificant in the other two models. 
   Table 3B presents the effects of changing individual characteristics on expected durations. 
Compared with the effects presented in Table 3A, in general these effects exhibit larger discrepancies 
between models in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance. Again we first discuss the 
effects for the left-censored non-employment spells (top left panel). Being older (age 35 versus age 
25) makes the expected duration of these spells significantly longer. This effect is about 7.5 months 
according to the two misreporting probability models, about 6.3 months according to the last month 
dummy model, and about 3.6 months according to the last month data model.  Those who have a 
full 12 years of education have an expected duration 5 to 7 months shorter than those with less 
education, and the last month data model predicts the largest effect. Only the two misreporting 
probability models estimate significant effects of being an African American (versus being White), 
lengthening the expected duration by about 2.5 months. The two misreporting probability models 
and the last month dummy variable model estimate that being Hispanic (versus White) makes the 
expected duration about 2 to 3 months longer. (Note that all of these effects are only significant at 
the 10% level.)  All four models estimate a positive and significant effect of having one child under 
six years old relative to having none, and this effect on expected duration is about 4 to 5 months. 
We discuss the effects on left-censored employment spells in Table 3B (top right panel).  All 
models predict that growing older (again 35 versus 25) makes the expected duration 3 to 5 months 
longer, with the estimate from the last month data model being the smallest. Having 12 years of 
education versus having less education increases the expected duration by 7 to 9 months.  The two   27
misreporting probability models estimate the effect of being African American to be small and 
insignificant while the other two models estimate that this reduces expected employment duration by 
a statistically significant 5 months. The two misreporting probability models and the last month 
dummy model variable estimate being Hispanic as shortening the expected duration by about 2.6 
months, while the last month data model does not detect a significant effect. Except for the last 
month data model, all of the other three models predict that having one child less than 6 years old 
reduces the expected duration by approximately 2 months. 
Turning to the fresh non-employment spells in Table 3B (bottom left panel), none of the 
models predict that age has a significant effect. The two misreporting probability models estimate the 
effect of having more education to be about 2 months, while the last month data model predicts this 
effect to be almost 4 months. The estimated education effect from the last month dummy variable 
model is about 3 months. Among the four models, the last month dummy variable model predicts 
the largest effect of being African American, with the expected duration being about 4.6 months 
longer. The two misreporting probability models predict this effect to be about 1.8 months, while the 
effect in the last month data model is statistically insignificant. None of the models show a significant 
effect of being Hispanic. The four models predict quite different effects of having one child less than 
six years old. According to the two misreporting probability models, this effect is about 1.2 months, 
while it is about 2 months according to the last month dummy variable model and about 3 months 
according to the last month data model.  
Lastly we discuss the effects of changing the explanatory variables on the fresh employment 
spells in Table 3B (bottom right panel). The two misreporting probability models estimate a small 
effect of age 35 versus age 25, with an expected duration of approximately 1 additional month. 
However, the other two models predict this effect to be much larger: more than 5 months.  The last 
month dummy and last month data models also predict the effect on expected duration of having 12 
years of education relative to less schooling (about 6 and 5 months, respectively,) to be larger than 
our misreporting probability models predict (about 3 months).  Only the last month data model 
predicts a significant effect of being African American, with expected duration being about 3 months 
shorter.  None of the models predict significant effects of being Hispanic or having one child less 
than 6 years old (versus none).   
Tables 3A and 3B show that there are important differences between our seam bias 
estimates and estimates from the last month dummy variable model, and very important differences 
between our seam bias estimates and those obtained using the last month data.  As discussed in 
Section 3, when considering completed spells, shifting from monthly data to the last month data 
yields a loss of about 20% of left-censored spells and about 50% of fresh spells.  The substantial   28
discrepancies in both magnitude and statistical significance between the estimates from our seam bias 
correction models and those from the last month data model are likely to be due at least partially to 
this major shift in data structure. While the last month dummy model often produces results that are 
closer to the results from the seam bias correction models than the results of the last month data 
model, the fact that important differences remain indicates that the last month dummy model is not a 
totally adequate solution.  
 
5.3  Results from the Extended Model with a Fraction of Individuals Accurately 
Reporting Their Employment Histories 
To further explore the misreporting behavior, we estimate an extended model as specified in 
equation (4.13) of Section 4.4 where some individuals never misreport. This model involves one 
additional parameter  A P , the fraction of individuals who always report accurately.  In addition, we 
also estimate a version of this richer model allowing  A P  and the six misreporting parameters to vary 
with ethnicity.    Our Online Appendix Table A3 presents the estimated hazard coefficients from the 
constant and variable probability versions of this richer model, while the misreporting estimates are 
reported in Table 4. The estimated hazard coefficients and standard errors are remarkably similar 
between the two models, and indeed they are very close to the results for the hazard coefficients 
from the constant and variable probability models discussed in Section 5.1 above. The last row of 
Table 4 Panel B reports the fraction of individuals reporting accurately. The constant probability 
model estimates that fraction to be 15.5% with a 95% confidence interval of approximately (9.6%, 
21.4%).  Interestingly, the race effects are no longer statistically significant in this richer model. These 
results reinforce our earlier conclusion that a simple constant misreporting probability model will 
serve the purpose of estimating the parameters of the hazard functions, but if a researcher is also 
interested in misreporting behavior per se, increasing the model complexity provides added valuable 
information about misreporting behavior.27 
 
5.4  Simulation Results for the Effects of Changing an Explanatory Variable on the 
Fraction of Time Spent Employed 
Estimating the effect of changing an explanatory variable on the fraction of time that an 
individual is employed is another useful exercise for policy purposes.  We use simulations to predict 
the fraction of time spent in employment over 3-year (short-run), 6-year (medium-run) and 10-year 
                                                 
27 We do not test the null hypothesis that the fraction of individuals who always report truthfully is zero, since 
again we would have to take into account that we are testing whether a parameter is on the boundary of the 
parameter space.     29
(long-run) horizons, as well as to examine how these fractions change with macro and public policy 
variables. We only use our simple constant misreporting probability model (presented in Tables 2A 
and 2B) for the simulation, since as noted above, the hazard estimates are very similar across our 
misreporting models. We simulate an employment/non-employment history for each individual over 
a particular time horizon and then calculate the sample fraction of time employed based on simulated 
individual histories. Note that the simulated fractions depend on the parameter estimates for all four 
types of spells (but not on the misreporting probabilities). Because the simulations are discontinuous 
functions of the parameter estimates, we cannot use the delta method to obtain standard errors; 
instead to obtain standard errors we follow Ham and Woutersen (2009) and sample from the 
asymptotic distribution of the parameters. We outline our simulation procedure in the following 
steps: 
1.  For each individual, we simulate her 10-year monthly employment history by unobserved 
heterogeneity type.28 For example, if the model indicates that there are two points of support for 
unobserved heterogeneity ( 2 J =  in the specification described in Section 4.4), we simulate two 
employment histories for each individual conditional on belonging to each of the two types. 
1.1 The starting point of an employment history is determined by the data. If a person was in a 
left-censored non-employment spell at the beginning of the sample, her simulated 
employment history will start with a left-censored non-employment spell. 
1.2 From the starting month, an individual monthly hazard rate is calculated based on 
unobserved heterogeneity type, observed heterogeneity (individual means over the sample 
period are used), spell type (e.g. left-censored employment spell) and spell length.29  
1.3 A uniform random number is drawn to compare with the calculated hazard and determine 
whether the individual exits into the next spell. Steps 1.2 and 1.3 are repeated for 120 
months for each individual and unobserved heterogeneity type. If individual i ( 1, iN = ) of 
unobserved type  j  ( 1, jJ = ) is employed in month t (  1,120 t = ) then  1
t
ij E = , otherwise 
0
t
ij E = .  
1.4  For individual i , we average simulated histories across unobserved heterogeneity type 
according to the estimated probabilities  j p  to yield weighted employment history 
                                                 
28 Our simulation results (including standard errors) are insensitive to increasing the number of simulations per 
person. 
29 Again we face the issue of what to do with the duration dependence once we get out of sample. We choose 
to freeze the hazard function for durations longer than 15 months at 15 months for fresh spells and freeze the 









2.  We average the simulated histories over the sample and over the first 36, 72, or all 120 months to 














































3.  We simulate standard errors for estimates of fractions as follows: 
3.1 We assume generate (1000) alternative values of the parameters using the estimated 
asymptotic Normal distribution.  
3.2 We repeat steps 1 to 2 for each set of parameter values to get new estimates of  3yr ER ,  6yr ER  
and  10yr ER . 
3.3 We construct standard errors for all three fractions using the 1000 estimates of  3yr ER ,  6yr ER  
and  10yr ER . 
4.  To predict the effect of changing one of the macro or policy variables on the above three 
fractions, we follow the previous steps by setting the variable of interest at different levels for 
each person and then taking the difference in estimated fractions. For example to estimate the 
effect of implementing positive incentives to leave welfare (carrot waiver policy), we first set the 
carrot waiver dummy to 1 for each person (i.e. carrot waivers are implemented in all states) to 
calculate 
1
3yr ER , 
1
6yr ER  and 
1
10yr ER ; then set the carrot waiver dummy to 0 for each person (i.e. 
carrot waivers are not implemented in any state) to calculate 
0
3yr ER , 
0
6yr ER  and 
0
10yr ER . 
10
33 yr yr ERE R − , 
10
66 yr yr ERE R −  and 
10
10 10 yr yr ERE R −  are the estimated effects of implementing a 
carrot waiver policy. 
5.  We estimate standard errors for the effects of changing macro or public policy variables 
following step 3 at each level of those variables. 
Table 5 presents our simulation results. The first row contains the estimated employment 
fractions for 3-year, 6-year and 10-year periods, respectively. The predicted employment fractions are   31
only around 44% for our sample of single mothers with 12 years of education or less. The rest of the 
table presents how those employment fractions would change with welfare policies and general 
macroeconomic conditions. Increasing the state maximum monthly welfare benefits by 10% reduces 
the predicted fraction of time employed by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. This effect is statistically 
significant but relatively small. Implementing a carrot waiver policy increases the predicted fraction 
of time employed by 3.6 to 4.2 percentage points, although these effects are only significant at the 
10% level. Implementing a stick waiver policy has no effect on the predicted fraction of time 
employed. We find that increasing the minimum wage by 10% also has essentially no effect on the 
employment fraction. Finally if the overall state unemployment rate increases by 25%, the fraction of 
time employed is predicted to fall by 1.4 to 1.8 percentage points. 
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
Transitions into and out of employment for disadvantaged single mothers are of crucial 
importance to policymakers, as they determine unemployment rates, poverty rates and the overall 
well-being of many low-income families.  In this paper we use the SIPP to estimate monthly 
transition rates into and out of employment for these women. Such employment dynamics have been 
relatively understudied in the literature, given the substantial policy interest paid to less-educated 
single mothers and their children and the emphasis that policy makers have placed on increasing 
employment durations as a means of increasing on-the-job human capital for disadvantaged women.  
Seam bias is an important problem that faces any researcher estimating transition rates from 
the SIPP.  In this study we propose a parametric approach to address this issue. Specifically, we 
develop a monthly discrete time duration model with parameters representing the propensity to 
underreport transitions in the first three months of a reference period. We first assume that 
misreporting probabilities are constant across individuals, and then consider a second case where we 
allow the misreporting probabilities to depend on demographic variables. We show that both models 
are identified without restricting the form of the duration dependence as long as we assume that the 
misreporting probabilities are the same for left-censored and fresh employment (non-employment) 
spells. We also estimate the hazard functions using two approaches found in previous literature: using 
only the last month data and putting in a dummy variable in the hazard for month 4 and then 
adjusting the constant using the estimated coefficient on this dummy variable. We find that our 
estimates of the parameters of the hazard functions from our seam bias models are not sensitive to 
allowing the misreporting probabilities to depend on race.  However, we do find that there are 
important differences between our seam bias estimates and those obtained from the last month 
dummy variable model, and very important differences between our seam bias estimates and those   32
obtained using only last month data. Our estimates of the hazard functions are also robust to 
allowing for the possibility that a certain fraction of individuals never misreport. We conclude that 
allowing for richer models of misreporting are important for understanding misreporting behavior, 
but not for estimating the hazard functions. 
In considering the issue of whether we have the “right” model of misreporting, we would 
make the following points: First, we estimate four misreporting models: i) our main model with  
constant misreporting probabilities, ii) our main model in which the misreporting probabilities are 
allowed to vary with the characteristics of the individual, iii) the richer model in which some 
respondents truthfully report while others misreport with  constant misreporting probabilities, and iv) 
the richer model still in which the probability of a respondent always truthfully reporting and the 
misreporting probabilities vary with ethnicity.  As noted above, all four of these models produce very 
similar estimates of the parameters of the hazard functions.  Second, the telescoping behavior 
assumed in our misreporting models is exactly the type of behavior that the 2004 revision of the 
SIPP aimed to minimize.  Third, a previous study that compared survey data against administrative 
records (Goudreau, Oberheu and Vaughan 1984) also suggests that our assumed misreporting 
behavior is the most common source of discrepancies between survey data and administrative 
records.  Fourth, our results on higher misreporting by minorities mirror the previous findings of 
Kalton and Miller (1991) and Black, Sanders, and Taylor (2003), who investigated how different 
demographic factors affect individuals’ reporting of Social Security income amounts and education, 
respectively.  Finally, we also consider three alternative models of misreporting and are able to reject 
them based on aggregates of our micro data. Thus we have considered a wide range of misreporting 
models; moreover, our choice of these models and our results are supported by previous research.  
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Panel A: Non-employment spells Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Right censored (%) 64.5% 42.6%
African American   0.34 0.48 0.33 0.47
Hispanic 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.38
12 years of schooling 0.44 0.50 0.61 0.49
Age 30.08 9.01 31.24 8.65
Never married  0.50 0.50 0.45 0.50
# of children < 18 1.98 1.19 1.72 0.97
Age of youngest child 5.00 5.09 6.56 5.10
# of children < 6 0.93 0.91 0.65 0.75
Disability (adult or child) 0.24 0.42 0.19 0.39
Disability variable missing 0.17 0.37 0.08 0.27
number of spells 3,528 2,578
number of individuals 3,528 1,889
number of observations: year*individual 63,384 18,811
Panel B: Employment spells Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Right censored (%) 69.9% 47.8%
African American   0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47
Hispanic 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.39
12 years of schooling 0.74 0.44 0.61 0.49
Age 33.99 8.49 30.86 8.58
Never married  0.27 0.45 0.45 0.50
# of children < 18 1.55 0.86 1.78 1.02
Age of youngest child 8.14 5.44 6.28 5.12
# of children < 6 0.46 0.66 0.68 0.76
Disability (adult or child) 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.38
Disability variable missing 0.13 0.34 0.07 0.26
number of spells 3,826 2,732
number of individuals 3,826 2,000
number of observations: year*individual 71,613 21,376
total number of individuals 7,354
total number of observations 175,184
Table 1.  Characteristics of Employment and Non-employment Spells               
Single Mothers with a Maximum of Twelve Years of Education
Left-censored spells Fresh spells
Left-censored spells Fresh spells
 
N o t e s :        
1. Sample means are from the first month of spells.           
2. Summary statistics across spells are not independent in the sense that some individuals show up in 
both left-censored and fresh spells.           
3. The numbers of spells reported in this table include both completed spells and right-censored 
spells. 
4. The total number of individuals in the sample is not the sum of the number of individuals in the 
four types of spells because some individuals have multiple spells of different types, e.g. a left-





Last Month     
Dummy






Last Month    
Dummy
Last Month   
Data
Maximum Welfare Benefit -9.985** -9.998** -10.130** -11.918** -7.757** -7.754** -0.756 1.561
         (2.386) (2.386) (2.122) (2.392) (2.957) (2.957) (2.262) (2.556)
Unemployment Rate -0.0613** -0.061** -0.0742** -0.081** -0.0004 -0.0003 0.038* 0.046*
         (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.025)
Minimum Wage 0.133 0.133 0.140 0.088 0.280 0.281 0.127 0.051
         (0.189) (0.189) (0.166) (0.194) (0.238) (0.238) (0.175) (0.199)
Welfare Waiver Stick -0.171 -0.171 -0.217 0.072 -0.397 -0.398 -0.119 -0.091
         (0.259) (0.259) (0.235) (0.225) (0.344) (0.344) (0.246) (0.278)
Welfare Waiver Carrot 0.043 0.044 0.085 0.106 -0.014 -0.014 -0.104 -0.255
         (0.190) (0.190) (0.166) (0.176) (0.218) (0.218) (0.170) (0.199)
African American -0.171** -0.175** -0.117 -0.129 0.088 0.085 0.346** 0.388**
         (0.085) (0.087) (0.077) (0.086) (0.100) (0.103) (0.076) (0.086)
Hispanic -0.184** -0.188* -0.140* -0.101 0.209* 0.207* 0.199** 0.133**
         (0.096) (0.098) (0.085) (0.095) (0.111) (0.114) (0.090) (0.105)
12 Years of Schooling 0.365** 0.365** 0.420** 0.509** -0.549** -0.549** -0.600** -0.670**
         (0.070) (0.070) (0.064) (0.072) (0.084) (0.084) (0.066) (0.077)
Age -0.049** -0.049** -0.040** -0.026** -0.039** -0.039** -0.029** -0.026**
         (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Never Married -0.441** -0.441** -0.367** -0.276** 0.203** 0.204** 0.229** 0.279**
         (0.084) (0.084) (0.076) (0.085) (0.097) (0.097) (0.076) (0.088)
# of Children < 18 0.010 0.011 -0.005 0.038 0.079 0.079 0.035 0.017
         (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.052) (0.052) (0.040) (0.045)
Age of Youngest Child 0.003 0.003 0.008 -0.012 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.024*
         (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
# of Children < 6 -0.284** -0.284** -0.292** -0.363** 0.160** 0.160** 0.137** 0.103
         (0.063) (0.063) (0.057) (0.068) (0.079) (0.079) (0.062) (0.074)
Disability -0.466** -0.466** -0.596** -0.615** 0.815** 0.817** 0.769** 0.844**
(0.092) (0.092) (0.085) (0.092) (0.103) (0.103) (0.083) (0.094)
Disability Variable Missing -0.106 -0.106 -0.209** -0.428** 0.363** 0.363** 0.332** 0.009
(0.118) (0.118) (0.106) (0.127) (0.139) (0.139) (0.107) (0.140)
Table 2A.   Duration Models of Employment and Non-employment Spells Single Mothers                      
with a Maximum of Twelve Years of Education - Left-censored Spells
Left-censored non-employment spells Left-censored employment spells
  





Last Month     
Dummy






Last Month    
Dummy
Last Month   
Data
log(duration) -0.363** -0.363** 0.288** -0.705** -0.314** -0.314** 0.432** -0.707**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.124) (0.064) (0.049) (0.049) (0.150) (0.065)
Square of log(duration) -0.188** -0.238**
(0.035) (0.040)
Last-Month Dummy - - 0.700** - - - 1.359** -
(0.064) (0.065)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Theta1 -1.195* -1.193* -1.121* 1.386* -2.971** -2.970** -3.579** -0.369
         (0.708) (0.708) (0.673) (0.846) (0.854) (0.854) (0.660) (0.800)
Theta2 -1.131 -1.132 -1.993** 0.685 -3.691** -3.692** -4.048** -0.878
         (0.707) (0.707) (0.632) (0.718) (0.842) (0.843) (0.657) (0.742)
Heterogeneity Probability
0.396** 0.396** 0.365** 0.265**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.106) (0.125)
Left-censored non-employment spells Left-censored employment spells
Table 2A. (continued) Duration Models of Employment and Non-employment Spells Single Mothers              
with a Maximum of Twelve Years of Education - Left-censored Spells
 
Notes:    
1. We allow unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated across different type of spells (see Section 4.4). For each model, the heterogeneity probability is 
the same for each of the four types of spells.    
2. Year dummies are included in each regression and their coefficients are omitted.   
3. Standard errors are in parentheses.   
4. The maximum welfare benefit variable has been divided by 10,000.   





Last Month     
Dummy






Last Month    
Dummy
Last Month   
Data
Maximum Welfare Benefit -3.414 -3.419 -7.348** -3.875 8.481** 8.474** 5.542** 11.675**
         (2.252) (2.252) (2.462) (3.666) (2.338) (2.339) (2.393) (3.924)
Unemployment Rate -0.054** -0.054** -0.054** -0.033 0.060** 0.060** 0.023 0.055
         (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.036) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.039)
Minimum Wage -0.150 -0.149 0.072 -0.232 -0.504** -0.505** -0.094 0.418
         (0.181) (0.182) (0.189) (0.296) (0.198) (0.198) (0.200) (0.321)
Welfare Waiver Stick -0.321 -0.322 -0.309 -0.215 0.176 0.176 -0.149 -0.508
         (0.199) (0.199) (0.208) (0.309) (0.181) (0.182) (0.204) (0.348)
Welfare Waiver Carrot 0.380** 0.380** 0.370** 0.243 -0.120 -0.120 -0.060 -0.276
         (0.127) (0.128) (0.150) (0.223) (0.139) (0.139) (0.148) (0.235)
African American -0.200** -0.196** -0.332** -0.089 0.061 0.061 0.065 0.247*
         (0.076) (0.077) (0.087) (0.128) (0.079) (0.080) (0.083) (0.144)
Hispanic -0.049 -0.046 0.023 0.194 -0.012 -0.012 -0.062 -0.093
         (0.086) (0.086) (0.097) (0.149) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099) (0.164)
12 Years of Schooling 0.211** 0.211** 0.226** 0.284** -0.420** -0.420** -0.358** -0.365**
         (0.063) (0.063) (0.070) (0.111) (0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.119)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.015** -0.015** -0.032** -0.039**
         (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Never Married -0.075 -0.074 -0.131 -0.130 0.079 0.079 0.080 0.239*
         (0.075) (0.075) (0.084) (0.130) (0.080) (0.080) (0.083) (0.146)
# of Children < 18 -0.063* -0.063* 0.021 -0.004 -0.018 -0.018 -0.005 0.061
         (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.061) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.064)
Age of Youngest Child 0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 0.002
         (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020)
# of Children < 6 -0.128** -0.128* -0.157** -0.232** -0.023 -0.023 0.003 -0.060
         (0.064) (0.064) (0.071) (0.111) (0.062) (0.062) (0.065) (0.110)
Disability -0.595** -0.596** -0.486** -0.590** 0.586** 0.587** 0.480** 0.426**
(0.083) (0.083) (0.092) (0.148) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.158)
Disability Variable Missing -0.283* -0.283* -0.443** -0.715** 0.702** 0.702** 0.152 -0.418
(0.157) (0.157) (0.149) (0.278) (0.155) (0.155) (0.143) (0.270)
Table 2B.   Duration Models of Employment and Non-employment Spells Single Mothers                       
with a Maximum of Twelve Years of Education - Fresh Spells






Last Month     
Dummy






Last Month    
Dummy
Last Month   
Data
log(duration) 0.103 0.101 -0.041 -0.688** 0.089 0.087 0.362** -0.706**
(0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.116) (0.101) (0.101) (0.109) (0.135)
Square of log(duration) -0.019 -0.019 -0.116** 0.065* 0.065* -0.278**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040)
Last-Month Dummy - - 0.950** - - - 1.360** -
(0.060) (0.061)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Theta1 0.541 0.533 -2.448** -0.004 -2.118** -2.113** -1.169 -0.319
         (0.662) (0.662) (0.694) (1.117) (0.711) (0.713) (0.743) (1.224)
Theta2 -1.634** -1.640** -1.251* 1.454 0.264 0.270 -2.254 -2.172*
         (0.663) (0.663) (0.694) (1.104) (0.711) (0.713) (0.740) (1.247)
Heterogeneity Probability
0.396** 0.396** 0.365** 0.265**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.106) (0.125)
Fresh non-employment spells Fresh employment spells
Table 2B (continued) Duration Models of Employment and Non-employment Spells Single Mothers              
with a Maximum of Twelve Years of Education - Fresh Spells
 





Month 1 Intercept  0.275* 0.989**
(0.142) (0.149)
Month 2 Intercept -0.174 0.410**
(0.174) (0.158)







Month  1 0.568** White 0.525** 0.729** White 0.689**
(0.035) (0.042) (0.029) (0.036)
Minorities 0.598** Minorities 0.765**
(0.039) (0.030)
Month  2 0.456** White 0.413** 0.601** White 0.553**
(0.043) (0.048) (0.038) (0.045)
Minorities 0.487** Minorities 0.645**
(0.040) (0.035)
Month  3 0.441** White 0.407** 0.585** White 0.534**
(0.044) (0.047) (0.039) (0.046)
Minorities 0.481** Minorities 0.627**
(0.037) (0.035)
0.384**





Probabilities Varying         
with Race
Probabilities Varying         
with Race
Table 2C.  Misreporting Probabilities Due to Seam Bias                        
Constant Probabilities vs. Probabilities Varying by Race                        
Panel A: Parameter Estimates
Probabilities Varying         
with Race
0.796**
Panel B: Misreporting Probabilities
Non-employment Spells Employment Spells
(0.168)
(0.159)











Notes: See notes to Table 2A. Also:    
1. For the constant probability model, the parameters in Panel A are based on the reparameterization 
specified in Section 5.1. 
2. For the model with seam bias probabilities varying with the minority dummy variable, the 
parameters in Panel A are specified in equation (4.11). 























































39.305** 39.299** 35.478** 38.834** 42.248** 42.252** 38.999** 41.157**
(0.731) (0.725) (0.574) (0.600) (0.608) (0.634) (0.533) (0.601)
0.515** 0.516** 0.552** 0.585 0.352 0.352 0.040 -0.074
(0.143) (0.169) (0.185) (0.495) (0.359) (0.259) (0.112) (0.228)
-0.639 -0.654 -1.313 -1.498 0.168 0.165 1.436 3.055
(2.892) (2.827) (2.608) (2.497) (2.655) (2.537) (2.253) (2.225)
2.427 2.427 3.228 -1.005 4.483 4.485 1.639 1.125
(3.458) (3.503) (3.416) (3.195) (3.514) (3.537) (3.400) (3.374)
-0.768 -0.773 -0.841 -0.485 -1.381 -1.383 -0.707 -0.250
(1.423) (1.079) (1.142) (1.345) (1.043) (1.201) (0.972) (0.873)
1.446** 1.445** 1.834** 1.806** 0.007 0.006 -0.898 -0.980





















11.821** 11.827** 16.458** 23.342** 11.929** 11.920** 27.711** 32.563**
(0.516) (0.514) (1.312) (2.254) (0.495) (0.497) (1.394) (2.197)
0.118 0.119 0.375** 0.196 -0.220** -0.220** -0.341* -0.565
(0.119) (0.149) (0.136) (0.407) (0.070) (0.062) (0.206) (0.446)
-3.099** -3.103** -4.531** -3.139 0.881 0.885 0.988 3.471
(1.009) (0.933) (1.703) (2.790) (1.074) (1.014) (2.471) (2.826)
3.138 3.152 4.388 2.950 -1.222 -1.220 2.453 6.266
(2.100) (2.075) (3.212) (4.323) (1.217) (1.228) (3.355) (4.187)
0.545 0.540 -0.375 1.238 1.484** 1.486** 0.608 -2.133
(0.613) (0.715) (1.027) (1.420) (0.538) (0.570) (1.180) (1.499)
0.835** 0.837** 1.226** 0.732 -0.693** -0.695** -0.633 -1.193
(0.343) (0.354) (0.550) (0.892) (0.277) (0.249) (0.593) (0.826)
Table 3A.   Expected Durations and the Effects of Changes in Macro and Public Policy Variables                            
Employment and Non-employment Spells                                                                           
Left-censored non-employment spells Left-censored employment spells
Average Expected Duration (in 
months)
Fresh employment spells
Average Expected Duration (in 
months)
Changes with respect to:
Maximum welfare benefits 
increasing by 10%
Minimum wage increasing by 10%
Unemployment rate                          
increasing by 25%
Stick waiver                       
(implemented - not implemented)
Carrot waiver                       
(implemented - not implemented)
Fresh non-employment spells
Unemployment rate                   
increasing by 25%
Changes with respect to:
Maximum welfare benefits 
increasing by 10%
Carrot waiver                       
(implemented - not implemented)
Stick waiver                       
(implemented - not implemented)
Minimum wage increasing by 10%  42





















7.471** 7.475** 6.253** 3.619** 5.095** 5.099** 4.328** 3.455**
(1.069) (1.098) (0.875) (0.902) (0.996) (1.012) (0.892) (1.005)
-5.293** -5.295** -6.398** -6.999** 7.013** 7.013** 8.813** 8.822**
(1.051) (1.126) (0.977) (0.992) (1.142) (1.111) (1.026) (1.106)
2.524* 2.584** 1.802 1.791 -1.074 -1.036 -4.938** -4.991**
(1.299) (1.268) (1.206) (1.299) (1.182) (1.218) (1.117) (1.142)
2.708* 2.759* 2.139* 1.402 -2.616* -2.583* -2.773** -1.630
(1.408) (1.449) (1.292) (1.357) (1.534) (1.479) (1.281) (1.528)
4.225** 4.225** 4.512** 5.120** -1.965* -1.967** -1.940** -1.299





















-0.070 -0.077 -0.220 0.106 1.027** 1.029** 5.479** 5.195**
(0.532) (0.514) (0.847) (1.261) (0.430) (0.420) (1.052) (1.439)
-1.940** -1.940** -3.057** -3.861** 2.970** 2.969** 5.984** 4.737**
(0.595) (0.593) (0.961) (1.497) (0.504) (0.503) (1.196) (1.671)
1.842** 1.808** 4.581** 1.214 -0.440 -0.438 -1.079 -3.199**
(0.718) (0.730) (1.252) (1.769) (0.590) (0.591) (1.381) (1.787)
0.435 0.407 -0.291 -2.521 0.090 0.086 1.027 1.175
(0.771) (0.773) (1.224) (1.904) (0.725) (0.708) (1.670) (2.116)
1.151** 1.155** 2.096** 3.101** 0.165 0.164 -0.043 0.763
(0.581) (0.575) (0.963) (1.493) (0.452) (0.452) (1.102) (1.424)
Table 3B.   The Effects of Changes in Demographic Variables - Employment and Non-employment Spells                      




12 years of schooling 





Number of children less 





Number of children less 




12 years of schooling 
(s = 12) - (s < 12)
Race 
(Black - White)
Changes with respect to:  43
Constant 
Probabilities




Probabilities Varying  
with Race
Seam Bias Parameters:
Month 1 Intercept  0.814** 1.614** 1.822** 0.605**
(0.217) (0.389) (0.314) (0.264)
Month 2 Intercept 0.257 0.837** 1.024** 0.041
(0.220) (0.321) (0.259) (0.270)
Month 3 Intercept 0.083 0.592* 0.802** -0.089
(0.216) (0.314) (0.222) (0.254)
Minority Dummy 0.3559 0.3499
(0.348) (0.253)





Table 4.  Misreporting  Estimates for the Models Where a Fraction of the 
Population Never Misreports                                      
Panel A: Parameter Estimates







Month 1 0.693 White  0.647 0.861 White  0.834
(0.046) (0.060) (0.038) (0.054)
Minorities 0.722 Minorities 0.878
(0.048) (0.036)
Month 2 0.564 White  0.510 0.736 White  0.698
(0.054) (0.067) (0.050) (0.068)
Minorities 0.597 Minorities 0.767
(0.058) (0.055)
Month 3 0.521 White  0.478 0.690 White  0.644
(0.054) (0.063) (0.047) (0.072)






Fraction of Accurate 
Reporting
Panel B: Misreporting Probabilities
Non-employment Spells Employment Spells
Probabilities Varying   
with Race
Probabilities Varying    
with Race
 
Notes:  See notes to Table 2C.   44













Table 5.  Effect of Changing Policy and Macro Variables on the Fraction of Time 
Spent in Employment for Different Time Horizons                             
Minimum wage                  
increasing by 10%
Unemployment rate          
increasing by 25%
Changes with respect to:
Average Expected Employment 
Fraction
Maximum welfare benefits 
increasing by 10%
Carrot waiver                       
(implemented - not implemented)
Stick waiver                       
(implemented - not implemented)
  




















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4
13 14 15 31 32 33 34






Data E spell: 4 months U' spell: 8 months U spell: 20 months E spell: 4 months
E spell: 5 months U' spell: 5 months U spell: 21 months E spell: 5 months
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4
13 14 15 31 32 33 34






5 months U spell: 24 months
Monthly
Data
E spell: 5 months

















E spell: 7 months U' spell: 5 months U spell: 24 months
observed
history
U' spell: 5 months
U' spell: 5 months
U' spell: 5 months
E spell: 8 months
E spell: 9 months
E spell: 10 months
U spell: 23 months
U spell: 22 months







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4
13 14 15 33 34 35 36
1 2 3 1 2 3 4
16
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4
13 14 15 31 32 33 34





E' spell: 12 months U spell: 24 months




3 months  47
Appendix 1: Identification of Duration Dependence and Seam Bias Parameters in Single 
Spell Data 
  At first glance, it may appear that we have to restrict the form of the duration dependence to 
identify our model. However, this is not the case, at least for fresh spells. For simplicity we consider a 
model for employment spells with duration dependence but no explanatory variables and no 
unobserved heterogeneity. (The argument for non-employment spells is identical.)30   One could 
estimate the parameters of this simplified model using the Analog principle (Manski 1994) by 
comparing sample moments and their probability limits, which we will refer to as population 
moments. 
   Let  () j mkdenote the empirical hazard function for spells ending at duration k  in reference 
month  , jj =1, 2, 3, 4.  These are our sample moments; denote their population counterparts by 
() . j p k .  To obtain these population moments, first assume that for the population there are  t N , 
1 t N − ,  2 t N − , and  3 t N − individuals having current durations equal to t ,  1 t − ,  2 t − , and  3 t −  in 
month 4 (over all reference periods). (One may think of  t N ,  1 t N − ,  2 t N − , and  3 t N − as being large but 
finite for now, as they will drop out of the population moments below.)  
  Regarding the terminology of the duration literature, for  4 t ≥ ,   t N ,  1 t N − ,  2 t N − , and 
3 t N − represent the total number of individuals at risk at durations t ,  1 t − ,  2 t − , and  3 t −  
respectively in month 4.  As discussed in Section 4.2, we assume that seam bias only occurs when 
transitions in months 1, 2, and 3 of the following reference period are heaped into current month 4, 
so  t N ,  1 t N − ,  2 t N − , and  3 t N −  are not contaminated by seam bias. For month 1, in large samples the 
number of individuals who actually enter month 1 at duration t  is  ( ) 1 11 t Nt λ − ⋅⎡− − ⎤ ⎣ ⎦.  This is the 
number of individuals at risk at duration t  in month 1, i.e. the difference between the number 
entering the previous month 4 at duration  1 t −  and the number who leave in the previous month 4 
at duration  1 t − . However, note that the number observed to be at risk consists of those actually at 
risk minus the sum of: 
1.  The number of individuals who actually left in month 1 at duration t but were observed to exit 
in the previous month 4 due to seam bias, ( ) ( ) 11 11 t Nt t λ λγ − ⋅⎡− − ⎤ ⋅ ⋅ ⎣⎦ ; 
                                                 
30 We ignore complications involving identification with explanatory variables since there are many papers on 
this issue for single spell data with time constant explanatory variables (Elbers and Ridder 1982, Heckman and 
Singer 1984c). Note further that we have multiple spells for some women to aid in identification 
(Honore  1993). Identification is also aided in our case by the fact that we have time changing explanatory 
variables in all types of spells (Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde 1997).   48
2.  The number of individuals who actually left in month 2 at  duration  1 t +  but were observed to 
exit in the previous month 4 due to seam bias ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 11 1 1 t Nt t t λ λλ γ − ⋅⎡− − ⎤ ⋅ ⎡− ⎤ ⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ; 
and 
3.  The number of individuals who actually left in month 3 at duration  2 t +  but were observed to 
exit in the previous month 4 due to seam bias 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 3 11 1 112 t Nt tt t λ λλ λ γ − ⋅⎡ − − ⎤⋅⎡ − ⎤⋅⎡ − + ⎤ + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦. 
 Of  those  actually at risk in month 1, in large samples a fraction  ( ) t λ  actually leave, but only a 
fraction  ()( ) 1 1 t λ γ ⋅−  are observed to have left in month 1, and the rest  ( ) 1 t λ γ ⋅  were reported to 
have left in the previous month 4 due to seam bias.  Thus the number observed  leaving 
equals ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 11 1 t Nt t λ λγ − ⋅⎡ − − ⎤⋅ ⋅ − ⎣⎦ .  Given this, we can easily formulate the first population 
moment condition for the fraction observed to leave in month 1 at duration t  (after deleting the 
common factor  () 1 11 t Nt λ − ⋅⎡ − − ⎤ ⎣⎦  from both the numerator and denominator) as 
( ) ( )
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t
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=
− ⋅ −⎡ − ⎤⋅ + −⎡ − ⎤⋅⎡ − + ⎤ + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (A.1) 
  For month 2, the expected number of individuals who actually enter month 2 at duration t is 
( ) ( ) 2 12 11 t Nt t λλ − ⋅⎡ − − ⎤⎡ − − ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  .  Due to seam bias, the number observed to be at risk in month 2 
consists of those actually at risk minus the sum of  
1.  those who actually left in month 2 at duration t but were observed to exit in the previous 
month 4,  ( ) ( ) ( ) 22 12 11 t Nt t t λ λλ γ − ⋅ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⋅ ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ and  
2.  those who actually left in month 3 at duration  1 t +  but were observed to exit in the 
previous month 4,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 3 12 11 1 1 t Nt t t t λ λλ λ γ − ⋅− − − − ⋅− +⋅ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦.  
Because of seam bias, the number observed to leave at durationt equals 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 22 12 11 1 t Nt t t λ λλγ − ⋅⎡ − − ⎤⎡ − − ⎤⋅ ⋅ − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ .  Thus our second population moment (after 
deleting the common factor  ( ) ( ) 2 12 11 t Nt t λλ − ⋅ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  from both the numerator and 
denominator) is  
2() p t = ( ) []











−⋅ − ⎡ −⎤ + ⋅ ⎣⎦
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  For month 3, the number of individuals who actually entered month 3 at duration t  is 
( ) ( ) ( ) 3 13 12 11 t Nt t t λλλ − ⋅⎡ − − ⎤⎡ − − ⎤⎡ − − ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . Due to seam bias, the number observed to be at risk 
in month 3 consists of those actually at risk minus those who actually left in month 3 at duration t  
but were observed to exit in the previous month 4, 
() () ( ) ( ) 3 3 13 12 11 t Nt t t t λ λλ λ γ − ⋅ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⋅ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . The number observed leaving equals 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 3 3 13 12 11 1 t Nt t t t λ λλ λ γ − ⋅ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⋅ ⎡ −− ⎤ ⋅ − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ .  Thus our third population moment 
(after deleting the common factor  ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 13 12 11 t Nt t t λλ λ − ⋅⎡− − ⎤ ⎡− − ⎤ ⋅ ⎡− − ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ from both the 


















  For month 4, under our assumptions the number of individuals who actually (and were observed 
to) enter month 4 at duration t  is  t N . The number of individuals who actually leave in month 4 at 
duration t equals  () t N t λ ⋅ . However due to seam bias, we also observe leaving in month 4  
1.  () ( ) 1 11 t Nt t λ λγ ⋅⎡ − ⎤⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦  individuals who actually left in month 1 of the next reference 
period but reported leaving in month 4,  
2.  ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 11 12 t Nttt λ λλ γ ⋅⎡ − ⎤⎡ − + ⎤⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  individuals who actually left in month 2 of the 
next reference period but reported leaving in month 4 and  
3.  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 11 1 1 23 t Ntt t t λ λλ λ γ ⋅⎡ − ⎤⎡ − + ⎤⋅⎡ − + ⎤⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  individuals who actually left in 
month 3 of the next reference period but reported leaving in month 4.  
The number of individuals observed leaving in month 4 equals the sum of  ( ) t N t λ ⋅  and the three 
terms above. Thus after deleting  t N  from both the numerator and denominator we have  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( )
41 2
3
() 1 1 1 1 1 2
11 1 1 23 .
pt t t t t t t
tt tt
λ λλ γ λ λ λ γ
λλ λλ γ
=+ ⎡ −⎤ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⎡ −⎤ ⎡ − + ⎤ ⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
+⎡ − ⎤⎡ − + ⎤⋅⎡ − + ⎤⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (A.4) 
  If we equate population and sample moments, we only have four equations in seven 
unknowns,  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 ,1 ,2 ,3 , , tt t t λ λλλγ γ +++ and 3 γ . However, we can have seven equations in 




















































 In fact, the model is actually over-identified, since we have many other moment conditions; for 
example  
( ) ( )
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, 
and we now have nine equations in seven unknowns.31 Since we can add many more moments 
without introducing new parameters, the model is significantly over-identified. Of course when the 
number of equations is greater than or equal to the number of unknowns, this is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for identification. To pursue this issue further, for the exactly identified models 
we used several reasonable sets of values for the empirical moments and let Maple solve for the 
parameters.   For each set of empirical moments, we found only one set of real solutions for the 
parameters when we restricted them to the unit interval.  
However, without any auxiliary information, the parameters for the left-censored spells are 
not identified. Since we measure the duration of these spells from the start of the sample, we will 
only observe a spell of length 1, 5, 9, 13… ending in month 1 of the reference period, a spell of 
length 2, 6, 10, 14 ... ending in month 2, a spell of length 3, 7, 11, 15… ending in month 3, or a spell 
of length 4, 8, 12, 16… ending in month 4.  Adding a superscript lc to denote left-censored spells, for 
4 t ≥  the available population moment conditions are as follows. For t = 5,9,13,… we have 
( ) ( )
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For t =  6, 10, 14,… we have 
()













λ γλ λ γ
⎡⎤ ⋅− ⎣⎦ =
⎡⎤ −⋅ − − + ⋅ ⎣⎦
 
For t =  7, 11, 15,… we have 
                                                 
31 Here we are abstracting from an endpoint issue. In the last month of the sample, which will be month 4, we 
would not expect any misreported transitions, since there are no future spells to misreport from. Thus we 
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For t =  8, 12, 16 we have 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( )
41 2
3
 () 1 1 1 1 1 2
11 1 1 23 .
lc lc lc lc lc lc lc lc lc
lc lc lc lc lc
pt t t t t t t
tt tt
λ λλ γ λ λ λ γ
λλ λλ γ
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ − ⋅ + ⋅ + − − + ⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ +− − + ⋅− + ⋅ +⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
For t = 4, 5, 6, 7 we only have four equations in seven unknowns. Unfortunately, if we add 
four more population conditions for t = 8, 9, 10, 11, we also will add four more unknowns 
(8), (9), (10), (11) 
lc lc lc lc λλλ λ . Thus we now have 8 moments for 11 unknowns and the 
identification problem remains. However, if we take the estimated seam bias parameters from the 
fresh employment spells and plug them into the left-censored employment spells, i.e. 
lc
kk γ γ = , for 
k = 1, 2, 3, the number of equations equals the number of unknowns, and the model becomes 
exactly identified. We thus impose this constraint and an analogous constraint for non-employment 
spells. Note that this identification problem would disappear if we had information on (and used) the 
actual start date of the left-censored spells. 











Year Percentage Sample Size Percentage Sample Size Percentage Sample Size Percentage Sample Size
1986 48% 2481 50% 1123 84% 111 70% 83
1987 54% 308 51% 1105 77% 174 86% 95
1988 40% 2519 49% 1030 78% 105 77% 97
1990 49% 4629 55% 2166 85% 331 83% 332
1991 48% 2663 52% 1301 87% 151 72% 120
1992 48% 4177 53% 2271 88% 346 76% 238





INTVW=1: self interview INTVW=2: proxy interview INTVW=3: refusal INTVW=4: left the sample
Table A1. Transitions of Employment Spells Ending in Month 4 As a Fraction of All Transitions                     
for Imputed and Non-imputed Data
Non-imputed Imputed